In the early-1970s, McBer and Company, a consulting firm, was approached by the US Department of State. It wanted to find a method to predict which Foreign Service Officer candidates would be most successful on the job. Of course, the State Department had been using a venerable exam that tested knowledge of liberal arts and culture such as American History and Western Civilization. It found, however, that the scores on these exams were actually negatively correlated with ratings of on-the-job performance. In short, their system was broken, and they needed a new way to select recruits.

McBer developed an approach that, in retrospect, was both elegant and obvious. The gist of their methodology was to ask high performers what they did in their work and compare those results to what average performers said and did.

The result was a fresh and new view of performance in action. It turns out that the best Foreign Service officers were excellent listeners, great networkers and persistent optimists. These so-called “soft skills” made the difference, all other things being equal. Knowledge of history and civilization were, if anything, extra embellishments but not really the core of the job.

McBer’s methodology was based on several relatively simple concepts. First, define what excellent performance is. This criterion usually has something to do with achieving quantitative targets—sales, safety goals, incremental improvement, and the like. Then, create two samples: people who consistently over-achieve those targets—whether it was safe landings on aircraft carriers, on-time delivery, or successful new products—and people who are average. For each group, observe how they work, ask them what they would do in different kinds of situations and compare the conclusions. The result will be a hypothesis that can be tested with another group of over-achievers and average performers.

The final competency model can be used for selecting and recruiting—using similar behavioral incident questions asked in the research—training for the job, professional development, and the appraisal of HR systems designed to manage performance.

Like everything else, when it works, it is great; when it doesn’t, it breeds confusion. To a large extent, confusion has landed in the world of competency studies. For the most part, this comes from the notion that listening to an idea—in this case the competency study methodology—is the same thing as understanding it. We believe that many performance professionals who conduct competency studies in organizations have a shallow understanding or a complete misunderstanding of what it is and how to do it.

For example, what passes for a competency study in some organizations is actually a job task analysis. In that methodology, all the different things a performer has to do in the job—the content of the job—are defined. To turn this into a competency study, someone—whether a focus group of performers or managers—highlights the tasks required for success. This is a combination between a wish list and a shopping spree. There is no necessary empirical correlation between the items being selected and their contribution to success. While useful for other purposes, a list of tasks, even important ones, does not constitute a description of what high performers do.

Similarly, some organizations opt for what has been called the “wise person” approach. Let’s say a new job category is opening up because of a strategic change in a business. Managers are going to have to run larger divisions with more direct reports. So, what makes for success in that future state? The “wise person” approach has been to ask an expert panel of usually higher-level executives to identify what a manager in that position has to be good at. The results paint a picture of the kinds of expectations executives have for the new job, and it is a useful framework for educating and recruiting candidates. However, unless the executives are extremely perceptive, this is not a description of competencies.

Even less effective, “wise people” panels assemble descriptive words like “integrity”, “courageous”, or “determined” to what they believe is a model of the ideal performer. Again, the picture that emerges is a desired expectation, not a guiding set of competencies. It may be useful at some level, perhaps to clarify what is needed, but not as a selection or training tool.

A competency involves empirically defining performance in different situations, comparing different responses, creating and testing a hypothesis. Organizations can implement in many different ways from simple to complex, but the basic idea is to study behavior. Without some degree of scientific method, a competency study isn’t really a study.

Remember, competencies are just that: personal behaviors and attributes that define success. “Listens with empathy” is a competency; “Interviews clients” is a behavior. “Knows how to get things done in the organization” is a competency; “Troubleshoots problems” is a behavior. A competency is a higher level of behavior, and it implies an attitude. Someone who “Listens with empathy” is excellent at picking up subtle signs and nuances when talking with someone and views that extra bit of communications detection as the key to understanding. People who are not competent don’t necessarily view the message in as many dimensions.

Competencies are not mechanical; they imply a deeper understanding of what is required. “Sits down regularly with direct reports to discuss performance” is much more than a process of sitting and talking. It reflects an understanding of how that performance discussion contributes to improvement.

Competencies are also more than one-time performances; they are regular parts of a person’s repertoire. People who are competent at listening with empathy always listen with empathy. The competency is a part of how they operate. The competency represents some manifestation, to some degree, of who these people are.

Which raises the obvious question: If competencies are a habitual part of someone’s repertoire, can we train people who don’t demonstrate those competencies? The answer is definitely yes. People can learn competencies just like they learn other behaviors they value. The kind of training and development required goes beyond skill training and into the realm of attitude change. The trainers or coach’s strategy has to be two-fold: develop the skill and demonstrate its value. An effective competency-building program is definitely not a one-shot event. In fact, the development of competencies is a continuing series of interactions between the learner and a coach or instructor.

One of the most useful applications of competency modeling is when an organization changes. Whether caused by a merger or shift in strategy, the organization will require new performances from all employees. The model represents the competencies individuals need to demonstrate as a collective team. With greater numbers of people in a company to learn a competency model, change agents have more options to employ. Critical mass training programs for every employee, manager meetings that reinforce competencies, knowledge management systems, company communications slogans and executive presentations are all vehicles for the new competency model. Is it easy? No way. A competency model can, in fact, become the heart of a company strategy. With persistence, organizations can learn to become more competent.

So, if you are a consumer or even an observer of competency models, beware. If you see lists of skills, be skeptical. If you see lists of adjectives, be doubtful. If a “team” developed the model in a two-hour meeting, be suspicious. A true competency model doesn’t have to be lengthy statistical project with a cast of thousands, but it does have to have some degree of scientific integrity.

© 2005 Singularity Group